Some people are convinced that George Bush stole the last couple elections. These claims are largely based on wild suppositions, the wildest of the suppositions being the claims regarding Ohio in 2004. In response to people's concerns regarding Diebold and possible vote tampering, a number of people are suggesting that after the election, election officials should do a sampling of ballots in every precinct to determine whether the machines are rigged. The proposals vary, but no one suggests more than a 10% sample of ballots be counted.
Under the sampling theory, we can know whether an election is fraudulent by looking at a mere 10% of the ballots. It's a ridiculous proposal, and will serve to increase voter cynicism and uncertainty about our vote counting process.
The proposal by the Election Defense Alliance has gathered a lot of attention and was brought to my attention after I spoke to the NIU law school Election law symposium in March. A person who is working with the EDA approached me about doing a pilot project in Champaign County using the EDA sampling proposal. I turned him down and referred him to our own vote count integrity program.
I offered a few points to him for which he had no response. Perhaps others do.
First, after a 10% sample, the results will all but certainly be different than the actual results. How much different will vary, but the likelihood of them being different by .5% is high. So for example, take the Myers Frerichs Senate race last year. Frerichs won by just under 1% (Frerichs - 27,149, Myers - 26,607, Parnarauskis - 1,894). Suppose we sample 5,565 ballots (10%) and we get the following results: Myers - 2,690, Frerichs - 2,685, and Parnarauskis - 190. This result is statistically not improbable. From a public relations standpoint it's a disaster. Certainly, those who understand or generally accept probability theory will not have an issue, except for those who have a vested interest in fomenting public dissatisfaction with the election process. A large number of other people will also have a problem because they simply don't understand the math. What we have done is not increased certainty, but rather increased uncertainty.
Second, the Election Defense Alliance suggests that they have a 99% chance of being accurate. That means, if they run this sample on every Congressional District, we will have four districts where the sample will show inaccurate results. In those areas, there will once again be a crisis of confidence.
Third, the random sampling will allow someone to program fraud into a system with a limited chance of being caught. So while the proponents of sampling speak of the high probability of 1% vote fraud being detected, they don't speak of the improbability of .2% vote fraud being detected. A computer programmer who wanted to drop one vote per precinct could have altered the Presidential election results in Florida, Iowa, Oregon, and New Mexico in 2000 and Wisconsin and Iowa in 2004. Sampling probably would not have caught this fraud.
Fourth, crimes are generally deterred by the probability of being caught. The Election Defense Alliance suggests that 40% of vote fraud would not be caught under a 2% sampling scheme as proposed in the Holt Bill. What that means is that anyone who rigs an election has a 60% chance of getting caught. I doubt that any computer hacker who is skilled enough to do all the programming work to steal an election would be willing to take that kind of risk. In fact, I'm not sure what criminal activity with a 60% chance of being caught is ever engaged in by reasonable people.
Fifth, the public has a right to know that their vote counting equipment is 100% accurate. Only a redundant recount in a sample of precincts can actually instill that confidence in people. When we conducted our redundant count, we were able to point to specific ballots that were likely the result of the vote discrepancies.
The Election Defense Alliance is sound in requesting some automatic triggers for redundant counts. I would fully support that. I was actually pleased when the election in the Village of Ivesdale went to a discovery recount. I wanted to know that indeed the votes were counted as they were cast. We found out that they were, and both the winners and losers in that contest can rest easy in the accuracy of the results.
Regaining the public's confidence in our election system is not beyond us. The most critical part of regaining that confidence is to provide facts instead of supposition and to engage in rational debate instead of lobbing wild accusations. Sampling is certainly not the answer.